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  Europe’s relationship with America is intimate and yet troubled.  Some have predicted 
that the expanded European Union (EU) of twenty-five countries, reaching from the Atlantic to 
the Russian border and with a population of 460 million people, a common currency and 
aspirations for a common foreign and defense policy will emerge as a powerful competitor to the 
United States.  European resentment of American political, economic and military predominance 
is real, and disputes have multiplied over a wide range of issues, from Iraq to the International 
Criminal Court to genetically modified foods.  Many foreign journalists, authors and politicians 
offer strident criticism of American policy and it is by no means excessive to ask whether the 
United States and Europe may now be on the verge of a divorce in which their alliance of more 
than a half century collapses or they even become great power rivals.   
  A number of European leaders have proclaimed their vision  of an EU comparable to the 
United States and – in the view of some – one that can act to counterbalance America.  The 
former head of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, observed that one of the EU's chief 
goals is to create “a superpower on the European continent that stands equal to the United 
States.”  For his part, French President Jacques Chirac, has said that “we need a means to 
struggle against American hegemony.”
1  Germany and France, in cooperation with Russia, not 
only opposed the U.S. on the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, but Chirac and his 
Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, took the lead at the United Nations in opposing the 
American policy and in organizing an international coalition against it. 
  This opposition came as no surprise to those who, since the end of the Cold War, had 
 
1  Quoted in The Economist, April 26, 2003.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 2 
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been predicting an imminent rupture of the U.S.-European relationship and the demise of NATO.  
For many observers, the removal of the Soviet threat presaged a new era and with it the 
unraveling of an alliance created in response to a Soviet Union that no longer existed.  They 
expected this distancing to occur not only in security policy, but across a range of economic 
issues, since the end of the Cold War removed the imperative to contain international 
commercial or financial conflicts for the sake of preserving the anticommunist alliance.
2  
European states would thus cease their collaborative bandwagoning behavior and instead begin 
to balance against one another or even against American power.
3  In the words of Kenneth Waltz 
in 1990, even before the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, “NATO is a disappearing thing.  It is 
a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may 
 
2  Benjamin J. Cohen, "`Return to Normalcy'? Global Economic Policy at the End of the 
Century," in Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, ed. Robert J. 
Lieber (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 74. 
3  On the return to great power balancing, see, e.g., John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56; 
Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," International 
Security, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51.  For a German realist, who interprets French defense spending 
as a form of military balancing against the U.S., see Werner Link: Imperialer oder pluralistischer 
Frieden? Plädoyer für eine Politik der kooperativen Balance [Imperial or Pluralistic Peace? A 
Defense for a Policy of Cooperative Balance], Internationale Politik 5/2003, pp. 48-56.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 3 
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linger on.”
4
  Predictions such as these were made in the months and years immediately following the 
end of the Cold War.  But by the mid-to-late 1990s, they seemed less relevant in the face of  U.S. 
led efforts to end the fighting in Bosnia (1995), the allied air war to stop ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo (1999), and the enlargement of NATO.  In turn, the September 11
th terror attacks on 
New York and Washington seemed to represent a new and much more ominous shared threat.  
Nonetheless, with the passage of time and with the eruption of bitter debates about Iraq and 
extensive European criticism of American unilateralism on a broad range of issues, the specter of 
an Atlantic rupture has reemerged.  Robert Kagan, in his widely quoted assessment, attributes 
the growing divergence to a profound difference in attitudes, in which America is now “Mars” to 
Europe’s “Venus”: 
It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view 
of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.  On the all-important 
question of power . . . American and European perspectives are diverging.  
Europe is turning away from power.  It is entering a post-historical paradise of 
peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant's "Perpetual Peace." The 
United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the 
anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and 
where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend 
on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and 
international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less . . . When it 
comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and 
 
4  Kenneth Waltz, U.S. Congress, Senate, Relations in a Multipolar World, Hearings before the  
Committee on Foreign Relations, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, 26, 28, and 30 November 1990  
(GPO, 1991), p. 210, quoted in Gunther Hellman & Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal 
Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Studies 3, #1, Autumn 1993, p. 17.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 4 
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fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and 
Europe have parted ways.
5  
  From a very different perspective, Charles Kupchan also concludes that America and 
Europe are fundamentally diverging, adding that “NATO, far from being in the midst of 
rejuvenation, is soon to be defunct.”
6  Kupchan bases his prediction on what he perceives as a 
shift in American strategic priorities away from Europe, an increasing political divide between 
the U.S. and EU, and a Europe at peace no longer needing its “American pacifier.”    
  Notwithstanding a long list of disputes and numerous predictions of political divorce, it 
remains premature to write the epitaph for the European-American partnership.  Despite its 
historic expansion, the EU is not about to emerge as a formidable superpower, let alone take on 
the role of balancer against the U.S.  The enlarged EU lacks sufficient central authority and 
 
5  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New 
York: Knopf, 2003), pp. 3-4. Italics added.  Though note Javier Solana’s rejoinder that Mars 
found solace in the arms of Venus. 
6  Charles Kupchan, “The Waning Days of the Atlantic Alliance,” in Bertel Heurlin and Mikkel 
Vedby Rasmussen (eds.), Challenges and Capabilities: NATO in the 21
st Century (Copenhagen: 
Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003), p. 25.  Kupchan elaborates on these themes in, 
The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first 
Century (New York: Knopf, 2002); and "The End of the West," Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 290, No. 
4 (November 2002).  Also see Stephen M. Walt, who advocated American disengagement from 
European security commitments, in "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting 
Apart," The National Interest, No. 54 (Winter 1998/99): 3-11.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 5 
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decision-making structure as well as the military capacity for an effective common defense 
policy.  In addition, a community of twenty-five countries now includes member states from 
Eastern Europe, whose history provides strong motivation for maintaining close ties with the 
U.S.  This perspective was evident in the support of the ten countries of the Vilnius group for 
American policy toward Iraq.  Indeed, the intra-European divide over Iraq policy provided 
evidence that the member states of the EU will not reach a consensus on balancing against the 
U.S.  Moreover, domestic politics, economic problems and the demographic profile of aging 
populations are much more likely to produce reductions in defense spending than the increases 
that would be required to provide the EU with the military capability of a major world power. 
  In sum, Europe’s lack of unanimity on foreign and security policy, the inability to 
provide for its own security, and shared interests in trans-Atlantic economic cooperation and 
institutions, require a continuing partnership with America.  Moreover, despite what Freud called 
the narcissism of small differences, the legacy of common values remains fundamental.  Europe 
has neither the will nor the capability for a fundamental break, and the interests of the United 
States work against a divorce as well.  Nonetheless, the sources of disagreement are deep-seated 
and have been increasing, and they deserve close attention.  In the remainder of this essay, I 
analyze the reasons for transatlantic conflict and then consider the underlying sources of 
solidarity in the relationship.  I conclude by assessing the circumstances in which radical change 
could occur and the reasons why true balancing against the United States is not taking place. 
 
I.  SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
  If, as Lord Acton famously said, power corrupts, then lack of power may also do so.  For   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 6 
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today’s Europe, and especially for counties once accustomed to a true international great power 
status, the disparity with the United States is especially painful.  During the Cold War, sheltering 
under the American security umbrella was an unavoidable imperative, though under De Gaulle 
and his successors the French quest for autonomy repeatedly pushed the Atlantic relationship to 
its limits. 
  These problems were not exclusively of Parisian origin. Virtually from the time of its 
inception in 1949, the Atlantic alliance weathered a wide range of disputes, not only concerning 
strategy, but economics and politics as well. One of the earliest crises erupted over German 
rearmament and the 1954 rejection of a proposed European Defense Community by the French 
National Assembly. The controversy was serious enough for Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles to threaten an "agonizing reappraisal" of America's relationship with Europe. Two years 
later, in 1956, the Eisenhower administration found itself at loggerheads with France and Britain 
when it joined with Moscow to condemn the Anglo-French expedition to retake the Suez Canal 
from Egypt.  A more subtle but far-reaching problem arose after the October 1957 Soviet launch 
of Sputnik, the world's first orbiting space satellite. With the American homeland potentially 
vulnerable to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), how could an American 
president credibly sustain the commitment to Europe if defending Paris or West Berlin now 
meant exposing Chicago or New York to a potential Russian nuclear attack?  Intra-alliance 
conflicts continued with the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command 
structure in 1966.  Symptomatic of disputes at the time was the title of a book by Henry 
Kissinger's, The Troubled Partnership.
7
 
7   Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 7 
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  Out-of-area disagreements also developed over France's desperate and ultimately futile 
efforts to keep control in Indochina (1946-54) and Algeria (1954-62), and subsequently over 
U.S. intervention in Vietnam.  A severe crisis erupted after the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, 
with the accompanying Arab oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands, and the 
French-led tilt toward the oil-producing countries in contrast to American support for Israel.  Oil 
and energy-related issues continued to reverberate in policies toward Iran after its 1979 
revolution and in disputes over the construction of a pipeline to carry natural gas from Russia to 
the West.  In the early 1980s, an intense crisis erupted over the U.S. and NATO decision to 
deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in order to counter Soviet SS-20 missiles.  
Multiple examples could be added to the list: trade frictions, economic competition, agricultural 
protectionism, cultural conflicts, and disagreements about policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, among other issues. 
  While these disputes were often intense, the underlying mutual security imperative 
caused Western Europe to remain closely allied with the United States in order to preserve an 
unambiguous American guarantee.  In recent years, however, and without Cold War concerns, 
the possibilities for fragmentation have increased.  Among the Europeans, France has become 
the most strident critic of American power and the most avid in seeking ways to increase its own 
autonomy and to steer the European Union toward an independent course. Near the end of his 
life, President François Mitterrand gave vent to a deep antagonism, declaring, "France does not 
know it, but we are at war with America. Yes, a permanent war, a vital war, an economic war, a 
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war without death. Yes, they are very hard, the Americans, they are voracious, they want 
undivided power over the world."
8  Subsequently, the then French foreign minister Hubert 
Vedrine proclaimed, "We cannot accept  . . .  the unilateralism of a single hyperpower," and 
President Jacques Chirac called for a "more balanced  . . .  distribution of power in the world."
9
  Note that Mitterrand, Vedrine and Chirac expressed these resentments during the mid and 
late 1990s, while the Clinton-Gore administration guided American foreign policy, and well 
before the 2000 election and the coming to office of the Bush administration.  Under Clinton, 
tensions emerged over Bosnia and Kosovo, the treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, the 
Kyoto Treaty on global warming, the International Criminal Court, the ABM Treaty, 
enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq, policy toward Iran, and policies toward the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This list serves as a reminder that serious disagreements, including 
complaints about American hegemony and unilateralism, have emerged under both Democratic 
 
8  Mitterrand died in 1996.  The passage is from a biography by Georges-Marc Benamou, Le 
dernier Mitterrand (Paris: Plon, 1997), and is quoted in Conrad Black, "Britain's Atlantic Option 
and America's Stake," The National Interest, Spring 1999, p. 22.   
9  Vedrine and Chirac were quoted in Charles Krauthammer, "Not for Moi, Thanks," 
Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1999. The then French foreign minister had used the word 
"hyperpuisance" to describe American power, though President Chirac later disavowed the term. 
Chirac's more restrained language can be found in an interview with Craig R. Whitney, "With a 
`Don't Be Vexed' Air, Chirac Assesses U.S.," New York Times, Dec. 17, 1999. 
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and Republican administrations and under presidents with very different leadership styles and 
policies. 
 
Reactions to the Bush Doctrine 
  With the start of the George W. Bush presidency in January 2001, European-American 
relations became increasingly acrimonious.  An important reason was the disputed outcome of 
the November 2000 election and the fact that the then Texas governor was largely unknown 
abroad.  European political leaders as well as journalists, commentators and foreign policy 
analysts displayed the anxiety that occurs when the White House suddenly is occupied by a chief 
executive unfamiliar to elites in Paris, Berlin, London and Brussels.  Many took cues from their 
American counterparts, most of whom had preferred Gore for president and expressed strong 
antipathy to the new administration.  European first impressions thus became lopsidedly 
negative, and there was not only an immediate uneasiness, but increasingly inflammatory press 
coverage of the new president.  Despite taking office with an experienced foreign policy team, 
Bush was frequently derided as a primitive, a Texas cowboy and even, in the words of one 
prominent British columnist, a “global vandal” and "reckless brigand."
10
  In the wake of the September 11
th terror attacks, European criticism of the Bush 
administration subsided and political leaders, the media and public embraced the United States in 
the presence of what seemed a threat not only to America but to the entire modern world and its 
 
10   Polly Toynbee, “Special report: European integration,” The Guardian (London), July 18, 
2001.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 10 
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values.  Despite an undercurrent of smug satisfaction that even the seemingly omnipotent United 
States was not invincible, or that America might somehow have deserved the attacks, there was 
widespread solidarity.  This was evident in public opinion polls and took the form of political 
support and active cooperation in intelligence and anti-terrorism measures. 
  Indeed, just one day after the attack, on September 12, 2001, the 19 members of NATO 
invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance.  
Article V treats an attack on one member state as an attack on all, and requires that they take 
action under their respective constitutional procedures.  Ultimately, sixteen of the then nineteen 
member countries contributed personnel to the Afghan campaign.  In the ensuing months, 
American air power and special forces, working with the Afghan opposition, quickly defeated 
the Taliban regime and its al-Qaeda allies.  The victory occurred far more rapidly and with far 
fewer casualties than many observers had expected,
11 but in order to retain tight control of the 
operation, the Bush administration opted not to conduct the Afghan war as a NATO operation.  
The decision made sense militarily, but it contributed to European resentments about 
unilateralism. 
  These reactions increased in response to the President’s January 2002 State of the Union 
address to the Congress in which he spelled out what became known as the Bush Doctrine (“The 
United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with 
 
11  For a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for success in the battle for Afghanistan, 
written shortly before U.S. and Northern Alliance forces captured Kabul, see John Mearsheimer, 
“Guns Won't Win the Afghan War,” New York Times, Nov 4, 2001.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 11 
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the world's most destructive weapons”) and especially Bush’s use of the term “axis of evil” to 
describe Iraq, Iran and North Korea.  During the following year, with the growing divide over 
the impending use of force against Iraq and the September 2002 release of the President’s 
National Security Strategy (NSS) document,
12 European criticisms of American policy 
intensified.  The change in attitude marked a shift away from the solidarity expressed by the 
allies in the initial days after September 11
th, and it occurred for reasons specific not only to the 
United States but also to Europe itself.  
  First, American policymakers together with a substantial part of the public saw 
September 11
th as a watershed and in their view the country now found itself in a war against 
terrorism.  By contrast, with the passage of time, Europeans were less inclined to share this 
understanding.  For example, an opinion poll conducted by the German magazine Der Spiegel 
eight months after the attacks, found that by a 3:1 margin Europeans saw September 11
th as an 
attack on America, but not on Europe or the world.
13  Though the analogy was misplaced, they 
tended to equate September 11
th with their own experiences of domestic terrorism during prior 
decades.  Indeed, in France, a sizeable minority even saw the United States as a threat.  In 
response to an April 2002 opinion poll asking respondents to choose from a list of France’s 
principal adversaries in the world, 31% pointed to the United States, ranking it the third greatest 
threat, after international terrorism (63%), and Islam (34%), and just ahead of small countries 
 
12  “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 20, 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 
13   Cited in R.C. Longworth, “Allies Are Worlds Apart,” Chicago Tribune, July 29, 2002.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 12 
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armed with nuclear weapons (30%).
14
  Second, there was a reaction against America’s willingness and ability to employ its 
formidable power without the agreement of the United Nations Security Council or deference to 
the expressed views of European leaders themselves, particularly those of France and Germany.   
In addition, foreign (as well as domestic) critics seized upon two features of the NSS: preemptive 
military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and the determination to maintain primacy by dissuading the rise of great 
power challengers.  Some even expressed the view that the U.S. itself was becoming a rogue 
nation. 
  Third, much of the European reaction was directed against the American-led effort to 
disarm Iraq and oust the regime of Saddam Hussein.  Policy differences had existed before, but 
in this case the intensity of German and especially French opposition and the way in which more 
animus seemed directed against a democratic ally, the United States, than at the tyrannical 
regime in Iraq, with its record of aggressive wars against its neighbors and flagrant defiance of 
binding UN Security Council resolutions, suggested an entirely different attitude.  Despite these 
criticisms, European governments were by no means unanimous in opposition, and the leaders of 
eight countries signed a letter by Prime Ministers Blair of Britain and Aznar of Spain that 
supported the United States.  (The other signers represented the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
 
14  “Sondage Ifop,” Le Figaro, April 2, 2002, 
www.ifop.com/europe/sondage/opinionf/fcemonde.asp.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 13 
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Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal.
15)  Shortly thereafter, ten countries of the Eastern European 
Vilnius group signed their own letter of support.  On the eve of the Iraq war, the Bush 
administration could thus claim backing from the leaders of four of the six largest countries in 
Europe (Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland) and from the leaders of at least eighteen European 
countries. 
  This official support masked the problem that by the time the war began on March 20, 
2003, European public opinion, with the partial exception of Britain and a number of Eastern 
European states, had become increasingly opposed to the use of force against Iraq.  Between July 
2002 and March 2003, there was a strongly adverse shift in European attitudes toward the United 
States.  In Germany, for example, where 61% of the public had held a favorable view of the U.S. 
versus 34% unfavorable, the numbers shifted to just 25% favorable and 71% unfavorable.  In 
France there was a similar swing, from a favorable 63% vs. 34% unfavorable to a negative 31% 
vs. 67%, and during the war, one fourth of the French public wanted Saddam to win.
16  Even in 
Poland and Britain, where the public remained sympathetic to the United States, there was an 
erosion of support.  Britain dropped from 75% favorable vs. 16% unfavorable, to 48% vs. 40%, 
 
15  For the text of the letter, see, “Europe and America Must Stand United,” The Times 
(London), January 30, 2003. 
16  The Economist, June 12, 2004.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 14 
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and Poland from 79% vs. 11%  to 50% vs. 44%.
17  These views reflected the heated political 
climate and often intense public opposition to the war, but even a year after the war, in March 
2004, only 37% of the Germans and 38% of the French expressed a favorable view of the United 
States.
18
 
European Attitudes and Structures 
  On both sides of the Atlantic, it has become commonplace to depict “Europe” as a single 
entity with shared attitudes and policy predispositions increasingly at odds with those of the 
United States.  This has been apparent in the words of European critics of America, as well as in 
the complaints by American critics of Europe.  But Europe is not monolithic, as evident not only 
on controversial foreign policy issues, but on wider questions of European unity and on whether 
an enlarged and increasingly institutionalized EU should plot its course as a counterweight to the 
United States or in partnership with it.  Britain and France have often been at odds over these 
issues, but other cleavages exist as well.  The smaller member countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal) have 
differed with the largest ones (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain) over the extent to which 
 
17  Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, cited in “Sinking Views of the 
United States,” New York Times. March 23, 2003. 
18  See “A Year After the Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger 
Persists,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for People & the Press, March 16, 2004, 
www.people-press.org.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 15 
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decision making authority within the EU should be based on the size of each state.  And, 
historically, there have often been disagreements between those who seek a truly federal United 
States of Europe versus those insisting on limiting the transfer of sovereignty.  These internal 
differences limit the extent to which Europe can take on an adversarial role vis-a-vis America.  
Nonetheless, there are commonalities that transcend the EU’s internal divisions. 
  Even countries that sided with the U.S. on the use of force in Iraq and that favor a close 
Atlantic partnership see multilateral institutions in a more favorable light than does Washington.  
On support for the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), and the role of the United Nations as a fundamental source of international 
legitimacy, European policymakers and publics mostly agree.  These shared views also exist on 
sensitive cultural and lifestyle issues.  One in particular is the death penalty, where European 
governments now uniformly oppose capital punishment, though popular attitudes have 
sometimes lagged behind.  Countries applying for EU membership are required to have 
abolished the death penalty, and the issue has become a source of friction with the United States. 
  Europe’s receptivity to multilateralism and to international institutions has been shaped 
by experiences of the past half-century in which the continental countries have finally 
transcended centuries of conflict and war.  Together, they have achieved steadily expanding 
cooperation and integration, the codification of agreed rules and procedures, and the transfer of 
previously sovereign state powers to the EU.  As a consequence, Europeans tend to draw lessons 
from their specific regional experience and transpose these to a global level. 
  This perspective can create tensions with the United States, as does a structural trait of 
the EU itself.  As the EU’s original institutions (the European Coal and Steel Community,   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 16 
 
16
                                                          
followed by the Common Market and European Community) expanded from six member states 
(France Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries) to nine, then twelve, fifteen, and then twenty-
five, agreement on common European policies has become an ever more cumbersome task.  
Though provision for decision by weighted majorities has steadily increased, unanimity is still 
required on the most important issues, including foreign and defense policy.  Thus, when the EU 
does manage to overcome coordination problems and succeed in hammering out common 
positions on specific issues, the policy stance often becomes inflexible.  As a result, negotiations 
between Europe and the United States become fraught with difficulty, since the opportunities for 
compromise and adjustment that would ordinarily exist between two large countries, each with 
its own central authority, are much less likely to be available on the European side.   
  Two other structural problems create obstacles to cooperation.  One is reflected in a 
widely quoted comment attributed to Henry Kissinger, “When I want to call Europe, whom do I 
call.?”
19  In some instances, the EU does have a single individual empowered to negotiate on its 
behalf, and the constitutional treaty agreed upon in 2004 addresses this problem by providing for 
a President and a single representative for foreign policy.  Nonetheless, it often remains difficult 
for the EU member countries to reach effective agreement with outside actors.  Another 
difficulty is political as well as structural.  In establishing their common identity, European states 
face a temptation to do so by defining their own position as distinct from that of the United 
 
19  According to a close associate of Henry Kissinger,  Peter Rodman, neither he nor Kissinger 
have any recollection of the former Secretary of State having written or said this.  Conversation 
with the author.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 17 
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States.  This creates an incentive for disagreement almost regardless of the substance of the issue 
at hand. 
  Then there remains the disparity of power.  The disproportion between the capacities of 
the United States and those of the individual European countries is so great that the latter often 
embrace multilateral institutions and rules as a means of limiting their superpower ally’s 
freedom of maneuver.  This impulse is intrinsic to disparities of size and influence, regardless of 
specific policies.  Indeed, a former French foreign minister once observed that were France to 
possess the kind of power the U.S. now enjoys, Paris would be even more cavalier in its 
exercise.  The power disparity also contributes to a free-rider problem.  Achievements such as 
security represent a form of collective or public goods for all the countries of the alliance, in the 
sense that they are able to benefit from it whether or not the Europeans contribute.  As Michael 
Mandelbaum has noted, peace in Europe, nuclear nonproliferation and access to Persian Gulf oil 
are examples of international public goods.
20  Not surprisingly, there is a temptation to evade 
responsibility because participants know that the U.S. is likely to pay the cost of dealing with 
potential threats (including economic ones), whether or not they contribute. 
  Note, however, that this kind of tension has been a feature of long standing and that it 
existed well before the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the 
world’s sole superpower.  A graphic  example of free riding, and of the accompanying buck-
passing, in which a costly or dangerous task is avoided, whether through inaction or deliberate 
 
20  Michael Mandelbaum, “The Inadequacy of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 
5 (September/October 2002): 66.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 18 
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evasion, was for many years evident in French policy toward terrorist groups operating in 
Europe.  During much of the 1970s and 1980s, Paris applied the “sanctuary doctrine,” in 
tolerating the presence of terrorist groups provided they did not carry out operations against 
French interests.
21  An egregious case of this behavior took place following the 1977 arrest in 
Paris of Daoud Oudeh, known as Abu Daoud, a founder of the Palestinian terrorist group, Black 
September.  His group had been responsible for the Munich Olympic massacre of Israeli athletes 
in 1972 and for the murder of the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo Noel, in 1973.  Ignoring 
extradition requests from Israel and Germany, the government of President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing instead deported him to Algeria.
22  During the 1980s and 90s, however, as the groups 
became more violent and in some instances took actions within France, the policy began to break 
down and intelligence cooperation with the United States and other European countries 
significantly improved. 
 
Policy Conflicts 
  On issues large and small, European and American differences have multiplied, and they 
are by no means confined to foreign policy.  In trade policy, for example, there have been 
continual frictions.  As a case in point, the EU filed a complaint against the U.S. in the World 
Trade Organization, challenging a policy that allows major American corporations to establish 
 
21  Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves,”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
82, No. 2 (March/April 2003): 75-90 at 77.   
22  New York Times, August 6, 1981.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 19 
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foreign subsidiaries in tax havens as a means of reducing taxes on exports.  The WTO ruled 
against the American policy and until such time as U.S. legislation is changed, the judgment 
allows the EU to impose $4 billion in punitive tariffs as compensation.  Conversely, in May 
2003, the United States and twelve other countries, including Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Mexico 
and Chile, filed suit against the EU for its five-year moratorium that had blocked exports of 
genetically modified (GM) agricultural products, even though no scientific evidence of health 
risks has been found. 
  The U.S. Special Trade Representative, Robert Zoellick, as well as President Bush, 
criticized European policies for causing unwarranted fears in famine stricken African countries 
that have a pressing need for food aid as well as for the improved yields of these crops.  In turn, 
European officials faulted the U.S. for refusing to join 100 other countries in ratifying the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, or the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an agreement for 
importers and exporters of genetically modified crops.
23  However, the Protocol itself was 
drafted in the face of U.S. objections, because it allowed importing countries to reject GM crops 
even without scientific evidence of risk, and American officials regarded its provisions as unduly 
restrictive.
24  Ironically, as long as GM crops face these obstacles, U.S. farmers producing for 
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certain export markets have had to adopt elaborate measures to avoid mixing non-GM seeds with 
the GM variants. 
  European critics of the U.S. sometimes convey the impression that the EU countries are 
far more altruistic and cooperative in their global relationships and in helping other countries to 
develop.  However, the EU, along with America and Japan, shares a pattern of protecting 
domestic agriculture in ways that are harmful not only to consumers and taxpayers, but also to 
agricultural exporters in the developing world who find it harder to compete against these 
subsidized products.  Indeed, the EU’s agricultural protectionism has been especially egregious 
(a tribute to the political effectiveness of French farmers), and Oxfam, the international aid 
organization, reports that the EU has higher barriers to imports from the developing world than 
any other large industrial economy.
25  Altogether, the EU farm subsidy programs amount to 
some $88 billion per year and those of the U.S. total $52 billion.
26
  On many of these issues, the domestic structure of European economies and political 
systems makes cooperation harder, not only with the United States but with other countries as 
well.  Historically high levels of unemployment, demographic pressures from an aging 
population, and rising costs to maintain generous social services and pension benefits, coupled 
with relatively higher taxes and rigidities in the mobility of labor and in regulatory policies, tend 
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to undercut Europe’s competitiveness with America and Asia.  These conditions foster restrictive 
economic and trade policies and thus greater friction with the U.S. and others.  In addition, 
European parliamentary systems, with the exception of Britain, mostly produce coalition 
governments that are constrained by the demands of their component groups. 
 
American Exceptionalism  
  The sources of transatlantic conflict are evident on the American side as well.  The U.S. 
political system can complicate the efforts of administrations of either party to implement 
coherent foreign policy strategies and to bargain pragmatically with others.  At times, divided 
government, in which the opposition party controls one or both houses of the Congress has been 
a feature of contemporary political life.  Under those circumstances, a president may have to 
compromise on much of his foreign policy agenda, especially on appropriations, confirmation of 
appointees, treaty ratification, trade policy and economic sanctions.  For example, the Clinton 
administration, after its first two years in office, had to deal with a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee chaired by the formidable Jesse Helms who saw the world in very different terms.  
As a result, administration policies on such issues as arms control, trade, the environment and 
multilateral institutions were less consistent with European preferences than might otherwise 
have been the case. 
  Even when the executive and legislative branches of government are controlled by the 
same party, serious problems in foreign policy making often exist.  For example, legislation in 
response to the WTO ruling on corporate foreign sales corporations was repeatedly delayed by 
partisan procedural disputes in the Congress.  The structure of Congress also tends to magnify   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 22 
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protectionist pressures, as evident for example in the web of subsidies and other barriers to 
import competition for domestic producers of steel, sugar and cotton. 
  American exceptionalism, the unique character of the ethos, society and culture in the 
United States, also sets this country apart from Europe.  For nearly two centuries, observers of 
America, from Alexis de Tocqueville writing in the 1830s to contemporary social scientist 
Seymour Martin Lipset, have identified fundamental factors shaping the American character.  
These include the absence of a feudal past, a “nonconformist” religious tradition, and the manner 
in which, during the 19
th Century, the legacy of the American Revolution evolved into a 
liberalism which emphasized individualism and anti-statism. An early 20
th Century American 
author, Mark Sullivan, provided a similar list of the country’s “distinctive characteristics.”  
These included individual freedom of opportunity, zeal for universal education, faith in 
representative democracy, adaptability, responsiveness to idealism and “independence of 
spirit.”
27  As Lipset later observed, Americans prefer a competitive, individualist society with 
equality of opportunity and effective but weak government.
28  In contemporary terms, these 
traits often take on a form almost guaranteed to antagonize European elites who, in the words of 
Walter Russell Mead, find American society “too unilateralist, too religious, too warlike, too 
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laissez faire, too fond of guns and the death penalty, and too addicted to simple solutions for 
complex problems.”
29
  These attitudes are reflected in differing understandings about modern society and world 
affairs.  In foreign policy, the most salient of these competing notions concerns nationalism and 
the use of force.  Robert Kagan, David Brooks, Walter Russell Mead and others have written 
eloquently about the diverging 20
th century experiences of Europeans and Americans.
30  For 
Europeans, nationalism brought repeated and catastrophic wars, and the use of force did not 
prevent most of their societies from being ravaged by war.  By contrast, with the exception of the 
Civil War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have been largely insulated 
from such devastation, and 20
th century military campaigns, with the exception of Vietnam, have 
been mostly successful as well as often laudable in moral terms.  Intervention against Germany 
in World War One, liberation of Western Europe from Nazi occupation in World War Two, 
defense of Europe from Stalin and his successors during the Cold War, and liberation of Kuwait 
are among the major cases, but even a number of recent smaller scale interventions (Panama, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti) can be seen in a positive light. 
  Contrasting World War Two experiences also help to explain differences between Britain 
and the continental Europeans.  Virtually all the European powers were either defeated and 
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occupied by Nazi Germany in the early years of the war, or in the case of the Axis powers 
(Germany, Austria, Italy), ultimately defeated and occupied by the allies.  By contrast, England 
managed to stand alone after the fall of France in 1940 and ultimately emerged at the end of the 
war with America and the Soviet Union as one of the victorious Big Three allies.  Britain did 
share the 1956 Suez debacle with France, but it did not suffer the kind of disastrous colonial 
wars that Paris fought in Indochina and Algeria from 1946 to 1962.  These experiences help to 
explain why Britain delayed so long in seeking Common Market entry and why it has typically 
been the least willing among EU member countries to relinquish sovereignty.
31
 
II.  SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY 
  Based on the above wide-ranging causes for a parting of ways – end of the Cold War, 
differences of structure, attitude, experience and policy – it would seem logical to begin writing 
the epitaph for the European-American relationship.  Indeed, not a few students of the subject 
have been doing exactly that.  Nonetheless, the conclusion is almost certainly mistaken.  Instead, 
practical experience not only of the Cold War decades, but of the years since 1989 suggests an 
entirely different lesson.  The EU’s capacity in the realm of foreign policy and defense remains 
limited, and on issues including proliferation, terrorism, international trade, financial stability, 
the environment, foreign aid and disease the evidence again and again is that there simply is  no 
alternative to cooperation with the United States.  Overall, the sources of Atlantic solidarity are 
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grounded  in the deep structure of the world in which Europe and America live, and they are at 
least as durable as the stubborn problems the Western world continues to face. 
 
Europe in the International System 
  European aspirations are often evident in the rhetoric of its leaders.  By addressing the 
outside world as though the European experience of the past half century was somehow 
universal, they imply the Kantian categorical imperative, “Act as if the maxim from which you 
act were to become through your will a universal law.”
32  But Latin America (viz. Cuba and 
Columbia), East Asia (North Korea), and South Asia (Kashmir, Pakistan, India) are not well 
understood through the EU lense, and even less is this optic useful in viewing the brutal realities 
of the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, terrorism, al-Qaeda, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), let alone 
Africa (Sudan, Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast).  The precepts and practices that now prevail on the 
continent, especially peace, domestic stability, the rule of law, cooperation, the transcending of 
national sovereignty, and agreed means for nonviolent resolution of disputes, are noble as ideals 
but often beleaguered or irrelevant in troubled parts of the world.  Indeed, insofar as portions of 
the Balkans are concerned, even Europe itself does not enjoy uniform cooperation, tranquility 
and the rule of law.  
  At the international level, the basic reality remains that of anarchy, meaning the absence 
of effective and binding sovereign authority above the level of the state.  In other words, there is 
no government of governments.  This feature has been repeatedly described by contemporary 
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scholars as well as in the classic writing of Thucydides and later in the work of thinkers such as 
Machiavelli and Hobbes.  The anarchy problem gives rise to security anxieties of states, referred 
to by realist scholars as a self-help system, in which states fear for their security and are 
ultimately dependent on their own efforts.  This in turn leads to a security dilemma, as states’ 
efforts to provide for their own security tend to make other states feel insecure.  This insecurity 
has been neatly expressed by John Mearsheimer, who has observed that, “. . . because there is no 
higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states cannot depend on others for 
their own security.”
33
  Of course, there exist important realms in which multilateral institutions and even 
international law do operate successfully.  Examples abound in economics, trade, 
communications, air and sea travel, health and other areas.  But on the most urgent and lethal 
dangers, existing law and institutions as well as the United Nations itself are frequently without 
the capacity or political will to act.  Evidence from the past several decades provides numerous 
examples: Iraq’s invasions of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990, Saddam Hussein’s flagrant 
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, North Korea’s violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Iran’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons (also in contradiction of the NPT); contraband trade by countries 
knowingly engaged in violating UN sanctions regimes; state complicity in drug-running, money 
laundering and terrorism; and the desperate problems created for their own populations and their 
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neighbors by failed states (as in the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and elsewhere.) 
  In cases such as these, the use of state power and of military force by the United States or 
by other countries that have the ability to act is often the sine qua non.  For example in the 
Kuwait crisis of 1990-91, without American leadership, UN Security Council Resolutions and 
sanctions would have been unable to prevent Iraq’s incorporation of that UN member state as 
Iraq’s nineteenth province.  In the case of  Bosnia, weapons embargoes, Security Council 
resolutions,  the creation of UN-protected  “safe areas,” and European intervention under UN 
auspices proved ineffective in halting murderous ethnic violence.  Only after three years and 
200,000 dead, did the United States finally take the lead in ending the killing there. 
  Impressive as it is, the EU’s experience of cooperation, law and institution building as a 
means to end conflict and war does not by itself explain how Europe itself managed to reach its 
present state.  While the miracle of  Franco-German rapprochement and European unity had 
multiple causes, the central factors in ending three centuries of balance of power rivalry in 
Western and Central Europe included World War Two, the Cold War and the role of the United 
States.  Among these were the devastating military defeat of Germany and the Axis powers, 
which discredited extreme and aggressive nationalism; the occupation of Germany and Italy by 
U.S. and allied forces; the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which required a large American 
military presence for the purposes of deterrence and defense; and the need for states that had 
previously been rivals (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and others) to cooperate within the 
American-led NATO alliance.  World War Two and the Cold War were thus critical factors in 
creating the conditions for European unity, and the American security umbrella had the effect of 
solving the anarchy problem on a regional basis.  As a result, European states no longer needed   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 28 
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to fear or balance against one another.  Of course, the ideals, passions, energy and institutions 
that went into creating the EU were necessary conditions, but by themselves they would not have 
been sufficient.  The relevant comparison can be found a generation earlier in the aftermath of 
World War One.  Then too, there was revulsion against the destruction and carnage of war, 
widespread expression of idealistic hopes for doing away with armed conflict, the creation of 
new institutions, most notably the League of Nations in 1919, as well as solemn international 
agreements such as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact to outlaw war.  But none of these prevented 
the downward spiral that saw Hitler and the Nazis take power in Germany and unleash the events 
that led to World War Two with its catastrophic destruction and ultimate horror of the Holocaust. 
 
Limits of EU Foreign and Defense Policy 
           With the enlargement and deepening of the EU, efforts to develop a truly European 
foreign and defense policy have intensified.  This is not altogether new.  Since at least the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty, the EU countries have been formally committed to a common foreign policy 
and since 1999 to important elements of a shared defense policy.  Yet Europe’s quest for a 
common foreign policy has delivered quite limited results, and progress toward a European 
defense has proved even more elusive.  This lack of achievement is no mere failure of policy or 
leadership.  Instead, the obstacles are deep-seated and are unlikely to be overcome for the 
foreseeable future.  They stem from two fundamental European deficits: the inability to reach 
internal political agreement and the incapacity to mount a common defense even if such 
agreement did exist. 
  Foreign and defense policies exist in a sphere of high politics and national sovereignty in   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 29 
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which states are reluctant to relinquish autonomy.  Decisions about the use of force, with their 
life and death implications, are not readily delegated.  Indeed, for all its insistence on a European 
identity separate from America, France has been the most assertive of its own foreign policy 
autonomy, even when this contradicts the positions of its European partners.  British leaders, too, 
have long been outspoken on not ceding control of foreign policy, considering it a core 
prerogative of sovereignty. 
  Prior to the 2004 signing of the constitutional treaty, the EU had not just one but two 
senior foreign policy representatives empowered to speak on its behalf.  One of these, Chris 
Patten, was a representative of the Commission, the other, Javier Solana, a spokesman for the 
European Council, on which the member governments sit.  Yet in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11
th, it was neither of these figures, but the individual leaders of Britain, France, 
Spain and Germany who flew to Washington in order to meet with President Bush at a time of 
grave crisis.  Not surprisingly, the EU constitution provides for a single individual with authority 
to represent Europe as a whole in foreign policy, yet on the most important policy matters the 
limits of both will and capability are certain to persist.   
  Another serious obstacle to a common EU foreign policy is that differences among the 
member countries have often been at least as great as those between Europe and the United 
States.  On Iraq, for example, governments were deeply divided.  Most notably, Britain under 
Prime Minister Tony Blair aligned itself closely with the Bush administration and made a major 
troop commitment to the coalition.  By contrast, France under Jacques Chirac not only joined 
with Germany in leading European opposition to the use of force, but sought to organize a 
worldwide campaign against United States policy.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 30 
 
30
                                                          
  Political differences such as these are not new.  For example, in 1991, responding to the 
increasing turmoil in Yugoslavia and the unwillingness of the United States to intervene in 
another crisis in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the president of the European Council, 
foreign minister Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, proclaimed that "the age of Europe has 
dawned."
34  But a lack of political agreement and of capability left the EU unable to act, thus 
compounding Yugoslavia's tragedy. Kosovo was another case in point, with Britain more 
assertive than the United States in advocating the use of force, while Greece (historically 
sympathetic to the Serbs) opposed the action. 
  The expansion of the EU widens these differences even as it adds to the number of 
countries supportive of close ties with the United States.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
especially Poland have painful historical memories of their treatment at the hands of their 
powerful neighbors, Germany and Russia, and they have good reason to look to the United States 
for credible security guarantees. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have even 
stronger motivation.  After signing a statement supporting the U.S. use of force against Iraq, 
these countries found themselves the target of intense pressure from France.  President Chirac 
uttered the condescending words, “Ce n’est pas tres bien eleve,”
35 (“This does not show good 
upbringing,”) and implied that East European dissent could adversely affect their pending EU 
membership.  As another example, Lithuania complained that France had failed to consult it 
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during delicate EU negotiations over Russian transit access to the territorial enclave of 
Kaliningrad.
36
  These incidents illustrate a larger point about the conduct not only of France but of other 
leading member states of the EU.  For all their rhetorical embrace of European solidarity, fidelity 
to multilateralism, and commitment to international institutions and laws, when they believe 
their national interests are at stake they are capable of acting unilaterally, regardless of these 
stated principles.  France’s protection of its agricultural interests, its refusal to allow the import 
of British beef despite EU clearance, its arm-twisting of the East Europeans, and its lax position 
on Iraqi sanctions in the years from 1992 to 2001 (not entirely unrelated to Iraq’s large debts for 
purchases of French arms) are cases in point.  But France is not alone, and whether in dealing 
with terrorism, national security, powerful domestic lobbies, or sensitive matters of national 
sovereignty.  Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain and others have been capable of acting with lesser 
regard for lofty principles.
37 Moreover, in the face of stubborn economic problems, including 
lagging growth rates and historically high levels of unemployment, France and Germany, as well 
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as a number of other smaller countries have defied the EU’s limit on domestic budget deficits.  
These countries have incurred deficits that break the EU- imposed ceiling of 3% of gross 
domestic product (GDP).  Indeed, Germany exceeded that limit in the years from 2002 through 
2004, even though its own government had played a major role in writing the rules for the EU’s 
“stability pact,” created to coincide with adoption of the Euro.  
  Even if the countries of the EU were to find themselves in complete policy agreement 
and to relinquish sovereignty concerns, their incapacity remains a stubborn obstacle to the 
emergence of a credible European defense.  In the aftermath of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
United States devotes more than $400 billion annually to defense.  In absolute terms this dwarfs 
the spending of all likely competitors combined, yet it amounts to just 4% of GDP, a figure well 
below the 6.6% peak in the mid-1980s during the Reagan buildup and much less than the double 
digit levels of the early Cold War years.  In contrast, the 25 counties of the EU spend just 55% of 
the U.S. figure,
38 yet even that amount gives them far less capability because the effort is divided 
among separate national defense budgets and much is wasted in duplication. 
  Europe deploys approximately 50 percent more troops than the United States, yet its 
large forces (many of them reliant on conscripts) are mostly more suited to traditional land 
warfare than to the specialized foreign interventions and high-technology weaponry 
characteristic of 21
st century conflict.  Until recently, the capabilities have remained remarkably 
limited.  For example, in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, despite the Europeans having two million 
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men and women in uniform, it took “an heroic effort” (in the words of the British Foreign 
Secretary) merely to deploy 2 percent of them as part of a peacekeeping force.
39  In contrast, as 
manifested in a series of stunningly successful military campaigns (Kuwait, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq), the U.S. has capabilities that no other country can match. 
  In material terms, the EU does have the ability to organize a significant and effective 
defense.  The creation of a new European Defense Agency (EDA) for the purpose of 
coordinating military research and spending reflects the aspiration to improve capabilities and 
prepare for global security threats.  Nonetheless, the EDA is a very modest undertaking and the 
structure of the EU’s political institutions, differences among its twenty-five member countries, 
demographic and financial constraints, and the weight of competing budget priorities largely 
work against fundamental change.  As evidence of these limitations and despite recent efforts, 
the Europeans still have fewer than 100,000 troops available for deployment abroad among their 
1.5 million regular soldiers available for NATO use.
40
 
  As if these were not sufficient obstacles to Europe's going it alone, there remains the 
problem of fragmented European defense industries: the larger states seek to protect their own 
corporate champions while often excluding more efficient foreign producers.  Even when 
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Europeans have cooperated acquire military equipment, they often face disproportionate costs or 
other limitations.  For example, a consortium of European countries is building the “Galileo” 
system of space satellites for its own global positioning system (G.P.S.).  Though this gives them 
a capability of their own, it does so at a cost of more than three billion dollars and largely 
duplicates what is already available from the United States.  As another example, seven 
European countries (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Turkey) finally 
agreed in May 2003 to purchase 180 large military transport planes from the European aerospace 
consortium, Airbus, at a cost of $24 billion.  In opting for European manufacture rather than 
buying existing and less costly American models, they purchased an aircraft (the A400M) that 
does not yet exist and the initial delivery of which will not begin until the year 2009.  Moreover, 
as another example of added costs in buying European, the $3.6 billion contract to build the 
engines for this aircraft went to a French-British consortium, even though a bid by an American 
manufacturer, Pratt & Whitney, was 20% less.
41
  Even with the new transport plane and a new Meteor air-to-air missile system being 
developed by an Anglo-French consortium,
42 Europe will remain far behind the United States in 
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air warfare capabilities.  Though the quality of European weaponry in air-to-air and air-to-
ground systems actually meets or exceeds that of the U.S., air superiority requires the integration 
of the most modern high-performance aircraft and avionics, weapons systems, surveillance, 
satellites, real-time intelligence, communications, targeting information, sophisticated radar, and 
battle-management systems.  In the absence of this complete package, the impact of any one 
component is diminished. 
  The types of military systems required for Europe to achieve effective modern 
capabilities demand not only a much more rational use of existing funds, but a higher level of 
funding altogether. Although France spends 2.6 percent of GDP on defense and Britain 2.5%, 
Germany, the European country with the largest population and economy, spends less than1.5 
percent.
43  Moreover, the imperatives of German economic modernization, high unemployment, 
budget deficits, an aging population and the political dynamics of coalition government, as well 
as cultural and historical factors, create pressures for lower rather than higher defense spending. 
  Elsewhere in Europe, comparable political, economic and societal constraints also tend to 
cause downward pressure on defense budgets.  The consequences are evident in the inability of 
the Europeans to create an effective Rapid Reaction Force.  The idea for such a body was 
conceived in 1999, in the aftermath of the American-led Kosovo action, and in reaction to 
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Europe’s difficulties (with the partial exception of Britain) in contributing either to the modern 
precision air war there or to a prospective land force intervention.  European governments, led 
by France and Britain, sought to create by 2003 a force of 60,000 troops capable of being 
deployed within 60 days and sustained in action for up to one year.  This force was to be 
available for action in cases where NATO opted not to intervene, and to carry out the so-called 
Petersberg tasks – largely humanitarian missions.  However, even this capacity, directed mainly 
at peace-keeping not the much more difficult requirement of peace-making, remained at least 
temporarily out of reach.  The Europeans lacked not only the overall number of 180,000 
designated troops (required for training and rotation purposes, in order to sustain the 60,000 
member force in the field), but also the transportation, surveillance systems, precision guided 
weapons and other modern equipment that such a force would require.
44
  Given its population, modern technology and wealth, the EU does possess certain kinds 
of military potential.  Britain maintains well-trained forces available for deployment in combat 
outside Europe, and its military personnel played active roles in the 1991 war to oust Iraq from 
Kuwait and again in the 2003 campaign to defeat Saddam Hussein.  British aircraft also took part 
in the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns of 1995 and 1999, and in enforcing the no-fly zones in 
Northern and Southern Iraq (1991-2003).  France has somewhat less capacity, but has intervened 
periodically in Africa in times of chaos or civil war, as in Ivory Coast and the Congo.  Moreover, 
the EU took a small practical step in March 2003, when it assumed command of what had been a 
NATO peacekeeping mission in Macedonia and deployed slightly more than 300 troops there in 
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a non-combat role.  Nonetheless, the achievement of a European military body in the foreseeable 
future will fall well short of the robust, independent force originally envisaged and the EU will 
remain without the military component of a true world power. 
 
American Capabilities and European Insecurity 
  Given its limitations in foreign and defense policy, Europe has fundamental reason to 
rely upon America as a hedge against future threats.  Though Russia appears considerably less 
chaotic than in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, even its future 
behavior cannot be assured.  Important parts of the old USSR remain troubled and the long term 
stability of the central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), the Caucasus 
(Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and the large East European Republics (Ukraine, Belarus) 
appears far from predictable.  Elsewhere, instability throughout parts of the former Yugoslavia, 
internal problems within the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and dangers stemming 
from the Middle East and Persian Gulf all represent potential risks. Upheaval along the European 
continent's  eastern or southern periphery, whether from economic collapse, ethnic  conflict, or 
interstate war, could send waves of refugees flooding into Europe. 
  As evident in the cases of Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, the actual or potential 
diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, including missile technology and nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons, also poses significant dangers for Europe.  While these threats are more  
diffuse and conjectural than the Soviet threat during the Cold War, they are not negligible and 
they provide a reason for European countries to retain their alliance with the United States as a 
form of insurance.  Consistent with these concerns, the EU heads of state and government in   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 38 
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December 2003 endorsed a European Security Strategy based on a proposal by Javier Solana, 
their High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, for facing five security 
threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, failed states and organized crime.  
Although the approval by the European Council deleted a reference in the original Solana 
strategy paper implying support for the preemptive use of force, it did retain language referring 
to robust intervention, preventive engagement and a crucial role for the United States (“acting 
together, the EU and the U.S. can be a formidable force for good in the world.”)
45
  Closely connected to Europe's need for an American  security partnership is the fact of 
U.S. primacy.  Only the United States possesses the means to project power abroad in a decisive 
and compelling manner.  Since the end of the Cold War, American might has been apparent both 
when it was deployed (as in Kuwait, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2002, Iraq 
2003) and when it was absent (Rwanda in 1994 and Bosnia prior to 1995).  With time, the 
relative margin of U.S. power vis-a-vis other actors appears to be increasing rather than 
decreasing.  Not only does the United States possess the ability to move large forces by sea and 
 
45  The European Council approval took place on December 12, 2003.  See also Fraser 
Cameron, “The EU’s Security Strategy,” Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 5, 
No. 1 (Spring 2004): 16-24; and the text of the European Security Strategy, pp. 100-116.  Also 
Peter van Ham, “Europe Gets Real: The New Security Strategy Shows the EU’s Geopolitical 
Maturity,” AICGS Advisor, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, January 9, 
2004.  For analysis of the Solana paper, see John Van Oudenaren, “The Solana Security 
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air across great distances on a timely basis, but  it also enjoys wide advantages in precision-
guided munitions, stealth technology, satellite communication, command and control, and the 
whole  panoply of forces needed to prevail in the air and on the modern  battlefield, even as it 
minimizes casualties to its own troops. 
  Despite the unusually harsh and vindictive rhetoric leading up to the Iraq war in 2003, 
even those governments most adamant in their criticisms of Washington still took pains to cite 
the overriding importance of the American security tie.  Thus Germany’s Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer observed, “As anyone with any sense of history realizes, the transatlantic 
relationship is the crucial cornerstone of global security, of peace and stability not just in Europe, 
not just in the United States, but around the whole world.  To call this cornerstone into question 
would be worse than folly.”
46   Similarly, just one week after the start of the Iraq war, French 
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, who had been the most strident critic of the United 
States, nonetheless proclaimed that, “Because they share common values, the U.S. and France 
will reestablish close cooperation in complete solidarity.”
47  The German defense minister was 
even more direct in observing that there could be no security in and for Europe without 
 
46  Speech to the Bundestag on transatlantic relations, quoted in German Information Center, 
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America.
48  And despite continuing tensions in the year after the Iraq War, Foreign Minister 
Fischer was explicit in expressing a sense of the common threat to regional and global security 
from “destructive jihadist terrorism with its totalitarian ideology.”
49
  In this context, the countries of the EU do have a security contribution to make, 
particularly in peacekeeping, policing and nation-building, tasks for which U.S. forces have 
often been less trained and adept.  Such activity takes the form of cooperation with NATO as the 
organization by far the best suited for coordinating large-scale multinational engagements.  EU 
military operations have been taking place in the Balkans, with the EU forces (using NATO 
assets) progressively taking on full authority in Bosnia. 
 
Shared Interests and Values 
  Not only do security imperatives underpin the European-American connection, but 
despite disparaging words hurled across the Atlantic, so too do shared interests and values.  
Euro-American economic relations are simultaneously cooperative and competitive. They are 
competitive in their rivalry for export markets and commercial advantage, but they remain 
cooperative insofar as all parties share a deep interest in preserving the successful functioning of 
existing arrangements for trade, investment, financial flows, and the international economic 
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institutions that sustain them.  Europe and the United States find themselves needing to 
cooperate through the International Monetary Fund, Group of Seven (G-7), WTO, and other 
groupings, not only to resolve mutual problems, but to cope with global financial and economic 
dangers.  Europe and the United States are one another’s top trading partner, and they have a 
huge stake in each other's economic health, as demonstrated by vast two-way flows of 
investment and transatlantic mergers in many industries. 
  Shared experiences and values complement these material interests.  Although the 
Western leaders who founded the great postwar institutions have passed from the scene and the 
events of the Cold War are a rapidly receding memory, other factors tend to sustain cooperation 
among policy elites, including easy familiarity with each other’s culture and, in the case of the 
Europeans,  a broad knowledge of American English.  The information revolution, the internet 
and the media have also fostered increasing communication and contact across a wide range of 
activities.  To be sure, not all these contacts are positive, as reflected in complaints about mass 
culture, "Disneyfied" entertainment, McDonald's, and the like.  Resentment about American 
predominance in these spheres is very real, but complaints have been expressed in some form 
throughout the past half-century, often as much by cultural critics in America as those in Europe.  
Moreover at the popular level, attraction to or at least fascination with American mass culture, 
clothing styles, music, entertainment, leisure, and language has spread throughout Europe, 
especially among younger generations. 
  Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that Europe and the United States continue 
to share basic values including liberal democracy, open economies (albeit in different 
variations), the rule of law, the dignity of  the individual, and Western notions of morality and   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 42 
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rationality. This underlying commonality remains fundamental, even (or especially) in an era of 
globalization.   Regardless of highly publicized differences, Europe and America continue to 
have far more in common with each other than with any other regions of the world. 
 
III.  RADICAL CHANGE? 
  Could Europe and the United States nonetheless one day come to an irreversible parting 
of the ways and even become great power antagonists?  Momentous events often arrive by 
surprise, so the question deserves attention.  In essence, a fundamental rupture would require the 
combination of two elements.  One of these is capability, the capacity of Europe to act as a great 
power opponent of the U.S.  The other is will - i.e., whether Europeans or Americans desire this 
to happen and seek to bring it about.  Despite the rhetoric of conflict, neither of these elements 
now exists nor seems likely, but under what conditions could they ultimately occur? 
  In terms of capability, the EU would need to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough in 
which member countries did not just talk about relinquishing fundamental political sovereignty, 
but actually did so.  A true European federation, a United States of Europe, would possess the 
institutional prerequisites for acting as a single great power in defense and foreign policy.  It 
would also need to make the politically difficult decision to allocate scarce resources in order to 
build a powerful military and to choose rivalry rather than partnership with the U.S.  Could this 
ever take place?  Theoretically, yes, though the likelihood remains remote.  Some scholars of 
international relations and history argue that reaction to America’s extraordinary predominance 
will lead to such an outcome, but for the combination of reasons cited above, there is little reason 
to anticipate such a transformation.   ACES paper-Lieber  - page 43 
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  Motivation and will also are key.  Were the Europeans to find themselves facing some 
unprecedented threat to their survival in circumstance where the United States was no longer 
able or willing to provide security, then the political impetus for Europe to provide its own 
security could emerge. On the other hand, the alternative of EU political fragmentation or 
collapse cannot be ruled out either.  By itself, a growing European-American divergence in 
values and beliefs of the kind to which Robert Kagan and others have pointed is unlikely to 
sustain this kind of change.  Instead, a steadily worsening climate of political dispute that finally 
reached a breaking point on both sides of the Atlantic would have to occur, and with it a collapse 
either in the will or ability of the United States to sustain its own world role. 
 
CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING THE LACK OF BALANCING 
  Just as it has been said that Britain and America are two countries divided by a common 
language, so it is tempting to add that Europe and the U.S. are divided by their shared history, 
interests and values.  Though some European leaders, most notably those of France, have 
proclaimed the need for Europe to counterbalance American power and indeed sought to do so 
over Iraq, it remains highly unlikely that any sustained balancing will take place.  For the 
foreseeable future, Europe lacks a viable alternative.  The United States is too preponderant, the 
countries of the EU too divided, Europe is without the means of its own defense and there is no 
real alternative to the security tie with the United States.  At the same time, Europe does possess 
a comparative advantage in postwar peacekeeping and nation-building.  Both Europe and the 
U.S. have a vital interest in the viability and institutions of the existing economic order, and only 
through their cooperation can they have any possibility of addressing broader world problems.    ACES paper-Lieber  - page 44 
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In addition, they share far more in common than appears from the cacophony of Atlantic debate.  
In sum, however ardently it may be predicted, or desired, by disgruntled critics, divorce is not on 
the horizon. 